The Protestant Imagination: A Note on Maruyama Masao, Robert Bellah, and the Study of Japanese Thought

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Prefatory note:

This essay was originally prepared for a panel, "Maruyama Masao, Political Philosopher," at the International Political Science Association, Fukuoka, Japan, July 2006. I revised the text following Bellah's death in July 2013, in part as a way of coming to terms with his unexpected loss.

In midsummer of 1980, the historian Ienaga Saburō sent Maruyama Masao a copy of his new book, *Zoku Shinran o kataru* (Speaking of Shinran, Continued), and Maruyama responded with a brief letter of thanks. In part it reads: "My family on my father's side were Pure Land (Jōdoshū) Buddhists, but my father himself was a thoroughly anti-religious, empirically-minded journalist, while my mother and her elder brother (Inoue Kiroku, a member of the Seikyōsha) were fervent True Pure Land (Shinshū) believers. Until middle school, in the mornings before breakfast I used to put my hands together and pray in front of our household Buddhist altar, but by the time I was an upper classman I had thought to myself, 'I'm no believer, and it doesn't make any sense to recite the *nenbutsu*.' But if I were asked who among the figures in Japanese intellectual history has had the strongest influence on me, I would answer without hesitation: Shinran. On the other hand, looking through your book…and seeing the passages where you were critical of Christianity, I thought that your way of thinking and mine are different. Your position is extremely close to Buddhism, yet you do not become a believer. A rather similar relation obtains, in my case to Christianity…" [1]

For modern Japanese thinkers who have reached a certain maturity, or perhaps a crisis, Shinran (1173-1262) has exerted an almost magnetic attraction. Kurata Hyakuzō's play,

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[1] Maruyama to Ienaga, in *Maruyama Masao shokanshū* (Misuzu Shobō, 2004), 3:18.

Shukke to sono deshi (The Priest and His Disciples, 1917), written out of its young author's own spiritual torment, created a contemporary Shinran (identified largely with the *Tannishō*), much as Karl Barth had done for St. Paul and his *Epistle to the Romans* (1918). Nishida Kitarō, Tanabe Hajime, Miki Kiyoshi, Hattori Shisō, among others, wrote on Shinran. Why? What does Shinran stand for? It could be the spiritual integrity, the existential authenticity of the individual thinker as reflected, however dimly or brightly, in the mirror of Shinran's own faith. It could be the recognition of radical evil in the soul and the world, and transcendence (through total dependence on Other Power) in facing it. It could be the classic religious paradox of "irrational" faith confounding human wisdom in the ineffable cry of praise to Amitabha Buddha and his Original Vow to show compassion to all sentient beings. In Ienaga's case, it was Shinran's embodiment of what he called the "logic of negation" in Kamakura Buddhism, one of the very few moments of "breakthrough" in Japan's intellectual and spiritual heritage when "values transcending everyday reality became the *nucleus* of Japanese thought." [2] At such a moment, culture, society and politics lie subject to judgments whose authority claims an absolutely Other, transcendent referent. But since those judgments must be acted on in the given social world, absolute Otherness must, paradoxically, subsist on fallible human instruments and materials. Otherness must become part of history, one self-consciously but imperfectly made in the image of that Other.

Now Maruyama wrote virtually nothing about Shinran—only a few scattered references in his published works, and an overview of Shinran's thought in his 1964 university lectures on Japanese political thought. [3] But along with this snippet of testimony, we may find another clue to what the attraction was. It comes from *Jikonai taiwa* (Interior Dialogues), the notebooks collated and published after his death, in a fragment (dated sometime after 1961) on Dostoevsky: "I first read Dostoevsky's *The Possessed* just after I had graduated from the university. Once having read it, I could never again return to the self I had been before reading it. I was raped [*gōkan sareta*] by Dostoevsky. To this day I have not recovered from the wounds this caused in me. Again and again it has worked as

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[2] "…became the *nucleus*": Katō Shūichi, *History of Japanese Literature: The First Thousand Years* (Kodansha International, 2002), p.215ff. Emphasis in original. Ienaga's key work in this connection is *Nihon shisōshi ni okeru hitei no ronri no hattatsu* (1940).

[3] For the lecture see *Maruyama Masao kōgiroku*, vol. 4, *Nihon seiji shisōshi 1964* (Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 2004), pp.234–52.

a brake on my innate tendency toward an emotional radicalism. Not just that; it forced me to become aware of what radical thought really was." [4]

Maruyama's comments on Shinran and Dostoevsky suggest that he saw the world as a darker and more desperate place than we are used to associating with him and his thought. [5(†1)] The problem of radical evil, Maruyama seems to say, is both personal and political, and must be confronted in both dimensions. It is a kind of hidden, inner lining to his far better known position on personal autonomy or "subjecthood" (*shutaisei*), which he regarded as the capacity of socialized individuals to make intellectual and ethical judgments; to act on their surroundings, their world, and to take responsibility as they did so. "The human being," Maruyama once observed, "is an animal endowed with a limitless capacity for self-deception." [6] In the world of modern politics, the opportunities for self-deception are legion and the consequences can be devastating. On the one hand, the Big Lie becomes the Only Truth; party loyalty (or discipline) justifies betrayal of self and others; physical and psychological violence become loving or stern "correction"; war becomes peace. On the other, "they" control politics (and economics); "I" don't care about it. As long as "I" am taken care of, and can buy what "I" want (things, feelings, ideas, influence), do "I" need to concern myself with what "they" do? Or we have the "let the market decide" fiction, in which there is, as Margaret Thatcher remarked, "no such thing as society." [7]

In the context of Japanese religious thought and its history, the perception of an innately wounded, defective, depraved or evil human nature has been most closely associated with the Salvationist "reform" Buddhism of the Kamakura era, and, of course, with the more recent import of Christianity. As we know, the historical—political—consequences for Japan of these Salvationist moments have been complex, and have captured the imaginations and critical energies of philosophers, thinkers, writers, and historians to this day. And it is that complex of consequences that sets the framework for my discussion here, which focuses on the problem of social self-transformation in Maruyama's thought.

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[4] Maruyama Masao, *Jikonai taiwa* (Misuzu Shobō, 1998), p.51. "Radicalism" is Maruyama's *katakana* gloss for *sayokushugi*.

[5] I thank Hiraishi Naoaki for first emphasizing to me Maruyama's deep sense of "sin." Personal communication, July 2004.

[6] Maruyama Masao, "Shisōshi no hōhō o mosaku shite—Hitotsu no kaisō," *Nagoya Daigaku hōsei ronshū* (1977), p.2.

First, I will sketch briefly what I call Maruyama's "protestant imagination" and try to account for one crucial line in its development; in the second section of the paper I will compare it with another such imagination—that of the sociologist of religion Robert N. Bellah, with whom Maruyama's intellectual life was for some time closely bound.

As Maruyama observed, neither he nor Ienaga had made a conversion to the respective "breakthrough" faiths whose influence and significance they both acknowledged. They remained by choice at the threshold or *limen* of organized religious life, of the community of fellow believers. Non-conversion too has a history. Max Weber had famously professed himself to be "tone-deaf" to religious feeling, even as he probed the literally world-altering character of the human type engendered by the Protestant Reformation in a vast comparative enterprise. An almost inverse case would seem to be that of Simone Weil, the Jewish-born French philosopher. A radical Platonist, mystic, and political activist on the left, Weil's entire spirituality was Catholic. But she refused baptism, holding that though "by right" the church was universal, "in fact" it was not. To that extent, the church's worldly limitations left outside it too much that she loved. There were solidarities and affinities that Weil refused to renounce, precisely on account of her faith. [8]

Leaving aside Ienaga now, why did Maruyama remain in his liminal relation to Christianity? If he had (lastingly) converted, with what community of believers would he have chosen to affiliate? What were the consequences of his non-conversion? The first question is (for me) not idle, but it is unanswerable. Concerning the second and third, it is possible to speculate with some measure of assurance. Maruyama had spent many of his intellectually formative years at the fringes of Uchimura Kanzō's Mukyōkai, the anti-institutionalist Non-Church wing of Japanese Protestantism. Chiefly this contact was

[7] Thatcher's pronouncement, her most famous, dates from a 1987 interview with Woman's Own that was later amplified in the Sunday *Times*. See the original interview transcript on the website of the Margaret Thatcher Foundation (www.margaretthatcher.org/speeches/). The relevant passages read: "I think we have gone through a period when too many children and people have been given to understand 'I have a problem, it is the Government's job to cope with it!' or 'I have a problem, I will go and get a grant to cope with it!' 'I am homeless, the Government must house me!' and so they are casting their problems on society and who is society? There is no such thing! There are individual men and women and there are families and no government can do anything except through people and people look to themselves first…There is no such thing as society. There is the living tapestry of men and women and people and the beauty of that tapestry and the quality of our lives will depend upon how much each of us is prepared to take responsibility for ourselves and each of us prepared to turn round and help by our own efforts those who are unfortunate."

through Nanbara Shigeru, with whom Maruyama studied at the Law Faculty of Tokyo Imperial University, and whom he regarded for the rest of his life as one of his two real teachers. With Nanbara, Maruyama read Hegel, and (despite his mentor's criticisms of Hegel) was himself "Hegelianized." It was Nanbara, also, who pressed Maruyama *not* to follow him into the study of Western political thought, but to confront Japanese political tradition on its own grounds, with and through its own texts, albeit via a historical method that was grafted onto those texts from outside.

Like his near contemporary and university colleague Yanaihara Tadao, Nanbara was a direct disciple of Uchimura, but unlike Yanaihara, Nanbara neither evangelized actively nor established a home-church with himself as spiritual father; nor did Nanbara follow Uchimura and Yanaihara into pacifism. On the other hand, Nanbara does seem to have absorbed something of the later Uchimura's eschatology, regarding his bureaucratic duties in essentially religious terms; he was to remain in place, performing his earthly tasks so as to hand over to the Lord on his return a piece of the world in good order. For Nanbara, religious faith was transmuted into bureaucratic expertise. Perhaps if we substitute "scholarly" for "bureaucratic," we may have an inkling of Maruyama's own attitude toward his choice of a way of life.

The Mukyōkai milieu in its various strands did present a coherent face to the Japanese intellectual world that Maruyama had entered: it exalted the individual conscience, the capacity to interpret the divine word without priestly mediation, and the physical inviolability of the person. It had a providential concept of nationality that rejected both traditional and neo-traditional patriarchalism, and rejected as well the quest for validation and legitimacy through dependence on foreign institutional authority. [9] Uchimura's Mukyōkai vision, in short, was of a Japan that had been elected as the site for the completion of the Reformation, in which the "church" lived through households and independent spiritual groupings that suffused and energized the very society.

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[8] On Weil see her *Waiting on God* (Harper Torchbooks ed., 1973), pp.61–83, 85–87, 94–98; also Jean-Marie Perrin and Gustave Thibon, *Simone Weil as We Knew Her* (1953; Routledge, 2003), pp.146–60; Richard Rees, *Simone Weil: A Sketch for a Portrait* (Oxford, 1966), pp.46–47. Note also her comment, in *Gravity and Grace*: "To contemplate the social scene is as effective a purification as to withdraw from the world, and that is why I have not been wrong in mixing for so long a time in politics" (1952; Routledge ed., 1995), pp. xvi,146.

Whatever his other, and vital, influences—Hegel, Kant, Weber, Fukuzawa, and so on—I want to suggest that in the absence of this Mukyōkai "impulse," Maruyama's conceptions of selfhood, politics, Japanese democracy, indeed of Japan itself, could not have taken the forms they assumed. On the other hand, if he had actually *converted* to Christianity, would he have been able to sustain the degree of critical identification—which was sometimes excruciating for him—that allowed him to immerse himself so deeply in the multiple worlds of the Japanese intellectual tradition? My sense is that he could not have done so. Maruyama, that is, became a protestant without becoming a Christian. His *imagination*, not his faith, was protestant. If Shinran symbolized the confounding of human depravity through the grace of Other Power, and Dostoevsky the capacity of self-deceiving total commitment to generate terror, Maruyama's protestant imagination offered a means of secular reformation. It led him to conceive a modern (Japanese) personality type capable of acknowledging the "demonic" psychological drives that propelled power-seekers through the world of politics, the massive force of "tradition" and social inertia, and the newer, nearly irresistible pressure to conform generated by mass media. This was a personality that, having said to the world, "I judge you to be wanting," would then seek to act effectually (in a solidarity of reason) to counteract those forces and to change that world.

What was the immediate inspiration for this "type"? In his 1948 essay, "Ningen to seiji" (Man and Politics), Maruyama wrote: "Perhaps the one capable of the most thoroughgoing protest from the standpoint of personal interiority [*jinkakuteki naimensei*] would be a radical Protestant, such as an adherent of the Non-Church." The "protestant imagination" in Maruyama was repelled by authoritarianism, especially when cloaked in the modernized charisma of the emperor, but also by corrupted "orthodoxies" based on

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9 Despite their rejection of emperor-worship as idolatrous, Mukyōkai figures were not hostile to the monarchy. Uchimura was certainly not. One of the sharp dividing lines between Maruyama and Nanbara (along with Yanaihara) was the latter's intense veneration of the emperor. This was a highly idealized, demythologized and humanized emperor, but nonetheless unacceptable to Maruyama under any circumstances. It is to be noted, on the other hand, that Nanbara did not wait until August 1945 to begin this demythologizing. While acknowledging the traditional identification of the emperor as *arahitogami*, Nanbara stressed that the "organic unity" between the Japanese emperor and his people stemmed from the "realistic" relation between them, one based on fear and affection directed toward the sovereign as the nucleus of a familial national community with natural, historical origins. See Nanbara Shigeru, "Gendai no seiji risō to Nihon seishin" (1938) in *Nanbara Shigeru chosakushū* (Iwanami Shoten, 1974), 3: 111–13.

"total" systems of thought, such as Marxism. The "protestant" was a man or woman who has "the sense of being bound by an invisible authority—whether it is God or Reason or an '-ism' [*shugi*] doesn't matter"—that goes beyond the "world that appears before our eyes as an experiential reality." The particularly modern danger of losing sight of the invisible, so to speak, is that of "being dragged along by visible authority—political powers, public opinion, reputation." [10] These were the forces that all too often subverted, bleached out, and denatured the "logic of negation" that lay at the core of the protestant imagination. With these forces we are all familiar; we live with their effects every day.

I turn now to the comparison of Maruyama and Bellah. [11] Despite major differences in their national, religious and generational backgrounds, the intellectual affinities between Maruyama and Bellah are deep and long running, and constellate around the notion of reformation. In it, explicitly or implicitly, both sought a viable modus and ideology of modernization. Rather than regard "tradition" as so tenacious that it required a violent, revolutionary, once-and-for-all inversion by an absolutely antagonistic "other," they both envisioned a modern social order capable of radical self-transformation and constant renewal through the critical reappropriation of its own original form and conscious-ness—its religio-political archetypes. In this sense, I will suggest, both displayed a "protestant" imagination that—in mutually differing ways—ended as an unfulfillable promise.

Robert Bellah, of course, is the author of *Tokugawa Religion* (1957), a landmark of Japanese studies. It remains in active service not only for its historical findings but just as much as an introduction to an important lineage in American sociological thought. Depending on whether one reads the original or 1985 edition, this was a study of either "the values of preindustrial Japan" or "the cultural roots of modern Japan." Bellah was a student of Talcott Parsons; and Parsons, as Bellah puts it, "had created an optimistic

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[10] Maruyama Masao, "Ningen to seiji" (1948), in *Maruyama Masao shū* (Iwanami Shoten, 1995), 3: 220; on "invisible authority": statement by Maruyama in round-table, "Maruyama Masao shi o kakonde—Chosha to kataru" (*Tenbō*, July 1966), in *Maruyama Masao zadan* (Iwanami Shoten, 1998), 5: 315. See also Karube Tadashi, *Maruyama Masao—Riberarisuto no shōzō* (Iwanami Shinsho, 2006).

[11] For a recent essay comparing Bellah and Maruyama (focusing on their conceptions of modernization), see Yamamoto Tomohiro, "Robāto N. Berā no Nihon kindaika ron—Maruyama Masao ni yoru hihan o chūshin ni," *Shakaigaku kenkyū*, no. 76 (November 2004): 161–187. I am grateful to Shimizu Yasuhisa for bringing this article to my attention.

Weber." [12] Synthesizing their approaches, *Tokugawa Religion* developed out of the multifarious strands of Japanese religious traditions an ideal type of attitudes and action that served as a "functional equivalent" of the inner-worldly asceticism of the Protestant ethic in its unintentional but decisively significant (causal?) relation to the spirit of capitalism. Did this "Tokugawa religion," Bellah asked, promote "rationalization" in the social system, and if so, in which of its domains? And could this "rationalization" be shown to have been extended, institutionalized, and formalized in the modern era, thus establishing a direct, positive linkage between traditional and modern Japan? In short, did Tokugawa religion provide the cultural roots of modern Japan? That was the project: and Bellah found what he was looking for, if not entirely where he was expecting to find it. To be sure, he located an impetus toward the "rationalization of means" in the economy, and he identified religious motives, movements, and thinkers—notably Ishida Baigan's *Shingaku* (Learning of the Mind/Heart)—that gave it cultural and moral sanction. But Bellah's key finding was that economic rationalization played the role of handmaiden (this is my term) to the more consequential process of rationalization that he saw at work in the polity. It was not the directly "universalistic" values of the economy that dominated the process of rationalization resulting in Japan's industrialization, but, with their support, the "generalized particularism" of the polity, whose values penetrated the economy. Traditional status-demarcated loyalties to the lord, domain, and ultimately the emperor were sublated, their social base vastly expanded, and their function "as-if-universal." By the 1930s, Bellah notes, the "particularistic-performance values" of the polity, of the "central value system," were "pushed" to an "extreme and pathological limit," and even at the time of writing were undercutting "the 'democratic' ideology of the postwar period." [13] But on the whole, no shadow of historical tragedy hangs over the book.

As Bellah notes in his conclusion, *Tokugawa Religion* does not really treat the post-1868 period. That was not merely a matter of his having chosen one research design among the many conceivable. As an ex-Communist who had failed to cooperate in naming names, Bellah was denied a passport to carry out doctoral work in Japan, and was therefore compelled to pursue a historical inquiry rather than fieldwork. [14] We may wonder how

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[12] Robert N. Bellah, *Tokugawa Religion* (Beacon Press, 1985), p.xii.

[13] Bellah, *Tokugawa Religion*, pp.105–06.

[14] See Robert N. Bellah, "To the Editor," *New York Review of Books* (February 10, 2005); on the passport issue: Bellah, personal communication, June 2006.

different his academic life and the field of Japanese studies would have been had the era's politics been different. But one fateful consequence of Bellah's having pursued the Tokugawa "roots" question was his intellectual encounter with Maruyama Masao. [†2] Maruyama reviewed *Tokugawa Religion* in the *Kokka Gakkai zasshi* at unusual length, not just recapitulating its arguments but analyzing the Parsonian system of pattern variables, rehearsing the exposition chapter by chapter, and then—in his final pages—boring in on what he termed its "great defect" and "grave misuse of Max Weber's logic." Maruyama was roused and excited by Bellah's work, and enormously respectful of it. His own *Nihon seiji shisōshi kenkyū* (translated into English as *Studies in the Intellectual History of Tokugawa Japan,* 1979) had appeared in book form only in 1952, and it seemed that the two authors were moving along convergent paths. Both had identified crucial impulses, in Japanese religious and political thought respectively, that pointed toward a process of indigenous modernization in Japan. While Maruyama's discovery of a "discoverer of politics" in Ogyū Sorai (1666–1728) ended in a thwarted breakthrough to modernity, Bellah seemed more sanguine. Maruyama simply could not accept Bellah's argument for the "internal relationship between the rationalization of religion and the rationalization of economy and polity" in Tokugawa Japan and its positive impact on modernization. For Maruyama, the "simple" (or simplified) emperor worship promoted by the "national learning" or *kokugaku* movement was far from religiously, let alone politically, rational. To the contrary: such worship was accompanied by the "penetration of the principle of piety into all social relationships through the incessant reproduction of the output of traditionalism from the integrative system." "Why in the case of Japan," Maruyama asks, "was not the process of the unification of the local divinities and folk religions ever a uni-directional course of liberation from magic?" The problem to be pursued, Maruyama argued, was "how the magical character at the top and bottom levels of the society internally characterized the Japanese rationalization and modernization and pushed it forward." "Pseudo-universalism," Maruyama urged, had lowered "the universalistic standard" by sanctifying hierarchy rather than equality under new conditions. The undeniable presence of rationalizing elements in society and in the "structure of personality" merely begged the question as to whether they were being "applied to life *methodisch-systematisch*": but only if they were could the "ascetic ethic stand in tension with this world" and have the "dynamism to change it." What Bellah had actually explained was "the tradition of the coexistence and the parallel use of loyalty and egoism, frugality and indulgence, serious endeavor and resignation." [15] Japan, to put it bluntly, had

not experienced a modern Reformation, and could not have done so. Its modernization, and therefore its modernity, was tragically incomplete, and as such, deformed.

Bellah's response to Maruyama's review was open-handed and accepting, to a point. In a way, he never stopped responding to it. By the early 1960s he had been able to travel to Japan and make up for lost time in examining contemporary Japanese religion and intellectual life. I would say, in fact, that the latter was his real concern, to judge by the series of finely wrought and ambitious essays on Ienaga Saburō, Watsuji Tetsurō, and the general question of intellectual and society in Japan that he produced over the succeeding decade. He acknowledged that Maruyama's critique had struck to the core of his argument, while also confirming his view of the special significance of Protestantism. "If Maruyama is right, and I am coming increasingly to believe that he is, then it becomes necessary to press beyond motivational and institutional approaches and to view matters in an even broader perspective…The Protestant Reformation is not after all some mere special case of a more general category. It stands…as the symbolic representative of a fundamental change in social and cultural structure with the most radical and far-reaching consequences. The proper analogy in Asia then turns out to be, not this or that motivational or institutional component, but reformation itself." Bellah went on to point out (drawing on Uchimura Kanzō) that the "failure of structural transformation" had authored disaster in Germany and transferred the mantle of reformation to England—and America, where he clearly believed it had remained. [16]

For some time, Reformation was *the* pivotal orientation in Bellah's thought, and he wrote, as Maruyama never could, from within it, not just in a scholarly sense but religiously as well. There is an almost proprietary feeling in his writings on this theme, as for example when he describes the "tradition of submerged transcendence" in Japan that had to wage a constant, even Sisyphean struggle against the still strongly salient value pattern in which the individual remains embedded in, even indistinct from the social nexus. He also used the metaphor of the "ground bass" to characterize that value pattern; in any case, the

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[15] Maruyama Masao, review of *Tokugawa Religion* (1958), as translated by Arima Tatsuo (MS), pp.37, 40, 41, 42–43, 44, 46. I am grateful to Robert Bellah for making this text available to me. Cf. Maruyama's original in *Maruyama Masao shū*, 7: 281, 283, 284, 285, 287–88.

[16] Robert N. Bellah, "Reflections on the Protestant Ethic Analogy in Asia" (1962), in id., *Beyond Belief: Essays on Religion in a Post-Traditional World* (Harper & Row, 1976), pp.53–63, esp. pp.57–58.

image of the Reformed society-that-ought-to-be informs almost everything Bellah wrote about Japan. [17]

In the end, however, *Tokugawa Religion* was to remain without a modern counterpart. By the late 1960s, Bellah's long-running concern with religious evolution, with its focus on the "axial" breakthroughs of the first millennium BCE, and a fortuitous but powerful intervention on "civil religion" in the United States combined to put an end (for the most part) to his active study of Japan.[†3] Perhaps his last important contribution was a 1978 essay contrasting what he called Ogyū Sorai's "conceptual consciousness"—abstract, distinction-making, instrumentalist, even manipulative—to the experiential, connection-making, ego-denying "symbolic consciousness" that he saw at work in Ishida Baigan's *Shingaku* teaching. While on the one hand clearly an acknowledgement of Maruyama's seminal work on the indigenous roots of modern consciousness in Japan, it is no less clear that for Bellah, the essentially religious attitude of Baigan was far more attractive; and, he implied, it was also vitally necessary if Sorai's "modernizing" impulse was not to be fatally severed from any moral moorings at all. But the key point was that *both* perspectives, the conceptual and the symbolic, had arisen in Japan without reference to or contact with the West. Both were authentically Japanese and demonstrated the capacity of "tradition" to reform itself in the direction of the modern. To that extent, Bellah reconfigured, but ultimately affirmed, the argument of *Tokugawa Religion*. He did not, it seems, fully accept Maruyama's critique after all. [18]

Yet in a larger sense, the "ground" that Bellah himself stood on had shifted. To account for an indigenous—and incipient—modernity in Japan was fine as far it went. But it begged the question of the realized form of modernity *tout court*. More and more it seemed to Bellah that the advent of "the modern" had nowhere brought a protestant paradise ("Calvinism from below") but instead various, and variously disastrous, deformations. If Japan in the 1930s and 40s was one such deformation (as Maruyama never ceased to believe), that of his own United States, he began to think, was another. But how was one

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[17] See for example, "Continuity and Change in Japanese Society" (1971) in id., *Imagining Japan: The Japanese Tradition and its Modern Interpretation* (University of California Press, 2003), pp.184–208; "Values and Social Change in Modern Japan" (1961) in *Beyond Belief*, pp.118–45.

[18] Robert N. Bellah, "Baigan and Sorai: Continuities and Discontinuities in Eighteenth Century Japanese Thought," in Tetsuo Najita and Irwin Scheiner, ed., *Japanese Thought in the Tokugawa Period* (University of Chicago Press, 1978), pp.137–52.

to confront this shared dilemma? With what intellectual resources, from what standpoint?

In retrospect, it might be said that Maruyama and Bellah had each produced an essay that at a crucial juncture shaped their public image and reacted back on their self-image in turn. Maruyama's was "Theory and Psychology of Ultranationalism," published in 1946 and succeeded by a string of related analyses of recent and contemporary issues in Japanese politics. Bellah's was "Civil Religion in America" (1966) which offered a critical *affirmation* of the immanent/transcendent principles by which Americans could judge their democratic polity and society. They make a nice dialectical pair. "Theory and Psychology" was a critical *negation* of what Maruyama saw as the pathological last phase of a corrupt and bankrupt imperial system that fully deserved its fate, and was meant to open the way to a new democratic political and moral consciousness. Without wishing to, over the next decade and a half he became an analyst of contemporary politics and a participant in political struggle. Perhaps this was the moment, the period of "Mitabi heiwa ni tsuite" (On Peace for the Third Time), *Nihon no shisō* (Japanese Thought), and the national movement of 1960 against renewal of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty that his protestant imagination achieved its fullest, most integral articulation. It is still thrilling to read his writings of that time. Eventually, though, Maruyama came to "protest" that activism and political analysis were only his "side business"; he was really a historian who had been pressed into service. And by the end of the 1960s, as Bellah was beginning his work on contemporary American society, Maruyama had largely removed himself from contemporary analysis. Commentators on his work sometimes express disappointment at this withdrawal, and not merely because it deprived Japan's public sphere of one of its major voices. Maruyama's retirement from the fray was accompanied by his immersion in research on what he successively termed the "prototypes," "ancient layers," and "*basso ostinato*" of Japanese political, religious, and ethical consciousness. It was a flight, some thought, into an ahistorical world of recurring archetypes—and one strikingly similar to, or perhaps influenced by, Bellah's own analysis of the basic value patterns at work in Japanese society. Severe collisions with the radical left did indeed play some part in leading Maruyama to close his "side business," but there were other reasons, of longer gestation, that I will discuss in closing.

For its part, Bellah's "Civil Religion in America" also touched a nerve. Published just as the American civil rights and antiwar movements converged, it drew its astonished author

more and more into simultaneous academic commentary and religious involvements, and into an increasingly visible public role as social science prophet. Indeed he was never to relinquish the public stage onto which this fortuitous intervention had propelled him. Although his role was put under severe strain—"civil religion," one writer on the left charged, was nothing less than fascist in spirit—in the beginning it was indeed a critical affirmation of American values that Bellah had to offer. [19] But as the sometimes wayward cultural experimentation of that decade yielded to a harsh neo-liberalism, he undertook an intense and sustained effort to confront—I think for the first time—the inherent, structural problems of the United States as a post-Reform society (*Habits of the Heart*; *The Good Society*). Increasingly, his prophetic office was to expose the global, and no longer merely national failures of America as a post-"axial" society—a failure in terms of both "axial" and "civil" religion, which, in nested fashion, could be brought to bear as sources of critique. Most worryingly for Bellah, those failures appeared as "flaws in the Protestant code" by which American society operated. As its individualistic "heart" had become diseased, its imperial pretensions were magnified: hence the "ferocious, disillusioned" jeremiads that make up his final writings on America in the world. [20]

Thus, from the Vietnam-war era onward, Bellah moved more and more, not less and less, toward the analysis, often in the spotlight, of his own time and place. Yet in order to do so, he moved and more, not less and less, toward the analysis of the initial "axial" breakthrough. [21] In the process, the radical Protestantism of *Beyond Belief* gave way. Bellah's own religious affiliation shifted to Episcopalianism and his associations were frequently with Roman Catholic theologians and social thinkers. Communitarian themes grew stronger, the philosopher Charles Taylor emerging as a particularly kindred spirit. As Bellah himself observed, the substance of his critiques of post-axial individualism may have been informed by his long-nurtured thinking about Japan as a "nonaxial" society, one

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[19] Note in this connection Maruyama's own assessment. At a regular meeting of the *Seitō to itan* (Orthodoxy and Heresy) research group in October 1989, he remarked: "Bellah proposed his notion of 'civic religion'···as an attempt to stem the relentless flood of social relativism and the social decay and pathological phenomena that accompany it. As such it can be understood as an American version of the movement to 'clarify the national polity'" that had effectively purged Japanese academia of liberal thought in the mid 1930s. Maruyama continued, "I said to Bellah: isn't your idea just like the 'clarify the national polity movement?' In reply he just laughed out loud—but he certainly didn't deny it." See "O-seitō to L-seitō (fukumu kokutairon)," transcript of remarks, 23 October 1989. Maruyama Bunko item #720-2, p.35.

[20] "···ferocious, disillusioned": Jeffrey Alexander (Yale University), personal communication.

unriven by the fateful cleavage between self and other, subject and object. Yet in the end, as at the beginning, Bellah was never just a "specialist" on Japan. Fascinated by evolutionary thought, he allowed his own thinking to evolve *through Japan* as well. Toward what? Toward the "now," the present: but a present judged in terms of the *nova et vetera* of axial religious thought. His last major work, *Religion in Human Evolution* (2011), attempts nothing less than to account for the emergence of four cases of "axial breakthrough"—in ancient Israel, Greece, China, and India—as the outcome of biological and historical evolution going back to the Big Bang. The story ends before the Common Era and is by no means one of progress. But Bellah makes a case for "axiality"—in irreducibly plural forms—as humanity's best hope for survival in a world where "our" capacities to do, make, or destroy anything seem to operate virtually without check.

At his death in 1996, Maruyama left unfinished a work that had been important to him: his collaborative examination of the relationship of orthodoxy and heterodoxy as constitutive ideas in Japanese political thought. Together with Ishida Takeshi (all the way through) and Fujita Shōzō (part of the way) and various members of the editorial staff of Chikuma Shobō, Maruyama devoted at least one day a month—and many hours of preparation—to the *Seitō to itan* (Orthodoxy and Heresy) project for upwards of thirty years. The examination of the Japanese political tradition in its entirety, but focusing on the modern "emperor system," formed the core of this project. But the fact that Maruyama structured it in this manner clearly points to the derivation of the problem from histories other than that of Japan, and to the religious (or religio-political) conceptions that directly and in secularized form have continued in complex ways to inform much of modern political life. [22] Maruyama described the prewar Japanese emperor system, for example, as a "dogma lacking a doctrine," suggesting that it fell short of the intellectual criteria for a true "orthodoxy." In his famous critique of de-Stalinization, Maruyama followed Sidney Webb in anatomizing the "disease of orthodoxy" in Soviet

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[21] See Robert N. Bellah, "Civil Religion in America" (1966), in *Beyond Belief*, pp.168-89; "Flaws in the Protestant Code: Some Religious Sources of America's Troubles," presented at Graduate Theological Union, Berkeley, May 1999; "75 Years," *South Atlantic Quarterly* (Special Issue, Dissent from the Homeland: Essays after September 11), vol.102, no.2 (Spring, 2002): 253-265; "What is Axial about the Axial Age?" *Arch. europ. sociol.,* vol.46, no.1 (2005): 69-89.

[22] The following account of the *Seitō to itan* project is based on Ishida Takeshi, "*Seitō to itan* wa naze mikan ni owatta ka," in id., *Maruyama Masao to no taiwa* (Misuzu Shobō, 2005), pp.36-93, with supplementary reference to Karube, *Maruyama Masao*. Neither Ishida nor Karube discusses the Maruyama/Bellah relationship.

communism. And he once described the mindset of Japanese followers of Trotsky as a heterodoxy "that lacks the dynamism to become orthodoxy." [23]

Maruyama was concerned with the dialectic of orthodoxy and heterodoxy—in Japan, China, Russia, and elsewhere—because he was concerned with the conditions and possibilities for the varieties of freedom in the modern world. As a self-consciously Japanese intellectual, Maruyama was drawn first and foremost to the question of freedom in his own society and tradition. The problem, as he was aware, was that the project's framing was essentially Christian; even Chinese Confucianism, though it possessed the sort of intellectual "axis" necessary for the construction and maintenance of orthodoxy, lacked the sharp delineation of opposed categories that came naturally, so to speak, to the Christian world. Maruyama and his collaborators struggled manfully with this insoluble problem; even as Japan entered modern times, and though Maruyama believed that thought of Western origin would eventually indigenize, still the framework could not be made to fit. Maruyama stuck with it, however, because he could find no more apposite construct for the understanding of the *experience* he and others of his generation and earlier had had of the "emperor system" and its ideological absorptive power, its undertow. As Ishida shows, the efforts were not without important analytical results. What passed for "orthodoxy" in Japan lacked dogma or logos; what it was in fact was a principle of legitimacy that was ritually, institutionally, and socially enforced—and hence strongly resistant to "reform." But as the postwar years proceeded, that "emperor system" itself had changed shape. It had (so Matsushita Keiichi famously argued), "massified," the social and political hierarchies that had supported it having either converged toward the "middle" or become economically superfluous. Along with this, Marxism as the anti-emperor-system had itself "weathered" and lost critical bite as its own supporting political apparatus weakened.

For Maruyama, this loss of referent provoked what he termed "a spiritual slump": existentially, he had been bound to the *tennōsei,* and pledged to its critical negation. At the same time, though the very term *tennōsei* was a Marxist coinage, Maruyama had also

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[23] "dogma": Maruyama, *Jikonai taiwa*, p.172; "disease": Maruyama, "A Critique of De-Stalinization" (1956) in id., *Thought and Behavior in Modern Japanese Politics* (Oxford University Press, 1969), pp.177–224; followers of Trotsky: Maruyama, statement in *Sengo Nihon no kakushin shisō* (Gendai no Rironsha, 1983), p.124.

defined his own stance via a critique of Marxism as an intellectual system. Facing the postwar *tennōsei* without a critical antagonist, Ishida relates, was to engage in "*noren ni ude-oshi*" (literally, "pushing against a shop curtain")—all one's strength came to naught against such an apparently pliant object. Indeed Maruyama began to lament the "loss of forms" (*kata no sōshitsu*) across the board, seeing a "mass" society subject virtually everywhere to the *visible* powers he warned against, particularly those operating under the sign of the mass-mediatized commodity. [24]

It would prove to be difficult to reappropriate "origins" and turn them to transformative purpose in the present. Maruyama was too much of a dialectician just to heroize or plunder the past in search of edifying role models. But whether it was the "remonstrating" medieval warrior challenging his lord to his face, the Confucian Ogyū Sorai discovering that institutions could be made and unmade, or Fukuzawa Yukichi seeking to break his countrymen of the habit of looking to state authority for moral values, Maruyama did not *shrink* from affirmation when it was possible to offer it. In the dialectic of affirmation and negation that was Maruyama's method, the latter moment took shape in the studies—also unfinished—of the "archetypal" forms of Japanese consciousness, historical, ethical, and political. While Robert Bellah could turn in the end to the exposition of an axial tradition to which he was positively committed, with Maruyama matters were otherwise. At the deepest layer of his own cultural tradition, Maruyama met his most tenacious antagonist.

(†1)　As a means of deepening scholarly understanding on this point, the holdings of the Maruyama Archive of works by and about Dostoevsky and Shinran, including those with Maruyama's marginal notes,

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[24] See Ishida, "*Seitō to itan*," p.54ff; Karube, *Maruyama Masao*, pp.184-86.

will likely gain even more in importance. For the moment, I append here a list of relevant titles held in the Archive. NOTE: All materials are listed in the language of the Archive copy only; that is, foreign works that Maruyama owned and read in Japanese translation appear only in Japanese.

The list below is arranged by accession order, and does not indicate shelving location (with the exception that materials with marginal notes or underlining—all held in closed shelves—are indicated with an asterisk*). Bibliographical information and recording style follows the TWCU OPAC cataloguing system. For further discussion of the significance of the arrangement of Maruyama Archive materials (the current state of the collection), see the Maruyama Archive Virtual Library (http//maruyamabunko.twcu.ac. jp/shoko/).

　　　⑴　Works by and about Dostoevsky

　ウオルィンスキイ『ドストエフスキイ』埴谷雄高訳, みすず書房, 1987, accession # 0180343

　ジョン・キャロル『水晶宮からの脱出：アナルコ＝サイコロジー的批判　シュティルナー, ニーチェ, ドストエフスキー』松原公護ほか訳, 未来社, 1980, accession # 0180988

　Stefan Zweig, *Drei Meister : Balzac, Dickens: Dostojewski*, Leipzig: Insel, 1921. accession # 0181888

　André Gide ; with an introduction by Arnold Bennett, *Dostoevsky*, transl. from the French, London: J.M. Dent, 1925. accession # 0183510

　F. M. Dostojewski ; mit einer Einleitung von Dmitri Mereschkowski, *Politische Schriften* (*Sämtliche Werke* ; Abt. I, Bd. 13.), München: R. Piper, 1920. accession # 0183513

　江川卓『ドストエフスキー』岩波新書, 1984, accession # 0184013

　松本健一『ドストエフスキイと日本人』朝日選書, 1975, accession # 0187860

　ドブロリューボフ『打ちのめされた人々』重石正巳・石山正三共訳, 日本評論社, 1949, accession # 0189486

　寺田透『ドストエフスキーを読む』筑摩書房, 1978, accession # 0189772

　ドストエーフスキイ『貧しき人々・分身』米川正夫訳, 河出書房, 1943, accession # 0190834

　ドストエーフスキイ『スチェパンチコヴォ村とその住人』米川正夫訳, 河出書房, 1943, accession # 0190835

＊ドストエーフスキイ『虐げられし人々　1』米川正夫訳, 河出書房, 1942, accession # 0190836

　ドストエーフスキイ『虐げられし人々　2／伯父様の夢』米川正夫訳, 河出書房, 1942, accession # 0190837

＊ドストエーフスキイ『罪と罰　1』米川正夫訳, 河出書房, 1941, accession # 0190838

　ドストエーフスキイ『罪と罰　2』米川正夫訳, 河出書房, 1942, accession # 0190839

　ドストエーフスキイ『悪霊　1』米川正夫訳, 河出書房, 1942, accession # 0190840

＊ドストエーフスキイ『悪霊　2』米川正夫訳, 河出書房, 1942, accession # 0190841

＊ドストエーフスキイ『悪霊　3』米川正夫訳, 河出書房, 1942, accession # 0190842

　ドストエーフスキイ『カラマーゾフの兄弟　1』米川正夫訳, 河出書房, 1943, accession # 0190843

＊ドストエーフスキイ『カラマーゾフの兄弟　2』米川正夫訳, 河出書房, 1943, accession # 0190844

　ドストエーフスキイ『カラマーゾフの兄弟　3』米川正夫訳, 河出書房, 1943, accession # 0190845

　ドストエーフスキイ『カラマーゾフの兄弟　4』米川正夫訳, 河出書房, 1943, accession # 0190846

　ドストエーフスキイ『貧しき人々』米川正夫訳, 河出書房, 1949, accession # 0190847

　ドストエーフスキイ『主婦』米川正夫訳, 河出書房, 1950, accession # 0190848

　ドストエーフスキイ『白夜』米川正夫訳, 河出書房, 1950, accession # 0190849

ドストエーフスキイ『ネートチカ・ネズワ゛ーノワ゛』米川正夫訳, 河出書房, 1951, accession # 0190850

ドストエーフスキイ『伯父様の夢』米川正夫訳, 河出書房, 1951, accession # 0190851

ドストエーフスキイ『死の家の記録　1』米川正夫訳, 河出書房, 1946, accession # 0190852

ドストエーフスキイ『死の家の記録　2』米川正夫訳, 河出書房, 1946, accession # 0190853

ドストエーフスキイ『地下生活者の手記』米川正夫訳, 河出書房, 1950, accession # 0190854

＊ドストエーフスキイ『賭博者』河出書房, 米川正夫訳, 1948, accession # 0190855

ドストエーフスキイ『白痴　1』米川正夫訳, 河出書房, 1948, accession # 0190856

ドストエーフスキイ『白痴　2』米川正夫訳, 河出書房, 1949, accession # 0190857

ドストエーフスキイ『白痴　3』米川正夫訳, 河出書房, 1949, accession # 0190858

ドストエーフスキイ『白痴　4』米川正夫訳, 河出書房, 1949, accession # 0190859

ドストエーフスキイ『永遠の良人』米川正夫訳, 河出書房, 1950, accession # 0190860

ドストエーフスキイ『未成年　1』米川正夫訳, 河出書房, 1947, accession # 0190861

ドストエーフスキイ『未成年　2』米川正夫訳, 河出書房, 1947, accession # 0190862

ドストエーフスキイ『未成年　3』米川正夫訳, 河出書房, 1948, accession # 0190863

ドストエーフスキイ『未成年　4』米川正夫訳, 河出書房, 1948, accession # 0190864

＊ドストエーフスキイ『作家の日記　1』米川正夫訳, 河出書房, 1947, accession # 0190865

＊ドストエーフスキイ『作家の日記　2』米川正夫訳, 河出書房, 1947, accession # 0190866

ドストエーフスキイ『作家の日記　3』米川正夫訳, 河出書房, 1947, accession # 0190867

＊ドストエーフスキイ『作家の日記　4』米川正夫訳, 河出書房, 1947, accession # 0190868

＊ドストエーフスキイ『作家の日記　5』米川正夫訳, 河出書房, 1948, accession # 0190869

ドストエーフスキイ『作家の日記　6』米川正夫訳, 河出書房, 1948, accession # 0190870（以上, 米川正夫訳本は『ドストエーフスキイ全集』）

＊メジレコフスキイ『トルストイとドストエフスキイ：宗教思想篇』香島次郎訳, 朱雀書林, 1942, accession # 0190948

ツゥルナイゼン『ドストエーフスキイ研究：辯証法神學より観たる』丸川仁夫訳, 新生堂, 1934, accession # 0190949

＊J・M・マリ『ドストイェフスキイ』西村孝次訳, 文学界社, 1936, accession # 0190951

ウオルインスキイ『ドストエフスキイ』埴谷雄高訳, みすず書房, 1959, accession # 0190960

＊ニコライ・ベルヂャーエフ『ドストイェフスキイの世界観』香島次郎訳, 朱雀書林, 1941, accession # 0190962

ウオルィンスキイ『美の悲劇：ドストエフスキイ『白痴』研究』大島かおり訳, みすず書房, 1974, accession # 0190965

＊ドストイエフスキイ著・神西清訳編『ドストイエフスキイ歴程』河出書房, 1949, accession # 0190966

作田啓一『ドストエフスキーの世界』筑摩書房, 1988, accession # 0190969

シクロフスキー『ドストエフスキー論：肯定と否定』水野忠夫訳, 勁草書房, 1966, accession # 0190970

ドストエフスキイ『ドストエフスキイ書簡集：禁行』笠間杲雄訳, 改造社, 1930, accession # 0190971

＊ヤンコ・ラヴリン『超人の悲劇：ドストエフスキの生涯と哲学』市川白弦訳, ふたら書房, 1940, accession # 0190972

弘文堂編集部編『ドストエフスキーの哲学：神・人間・革命』弘文堂, 1950, accession # 0190973

アンナ・ゼーガース『トルストイとドストエフスキー』伊東勉訳, 未来社, 1966, accession # 0190974

メレジュコーフスキイ『トルストイとドストエーフスキイ』（『世界名著叢書』第7編）昇曙夢訳, 東京堂,

1924, accession # 0190975

アンドレ・ジイド『ドストエフスキー論』武者小路実光訳, 日本社, 1946, accession # 0190976

＊シェストフ『悲劇の哲学』木寺黎二・小面孝作訳, 三笠書房, 1939, accession # 0190980

久山康編『ドストエフスキイの世界観』キリスト教学徒兄弟団, 1953, accession # 0191381

内村剛介『ドストエフスキー』（『人類の知的遺産』第51巻）講談社, 1978, accession # 0193189

ドストエーフスキイ『スチェパンチコヴォ村とその住人　1』（『ドストエーフスキイ全集』第6巻）米川正夫訳, 河出書房, 1950, accession # 0193992

埴谷雄高『埴谷雄高ドストエフスキイ全論集』講談社, 1979, accession # 0205337

⑵　Works by and about Shinran

親鸞述・唯圓編『歎異抄』金子大栄校訂, 岩波文庫, 改版, 1958, accession # 0180535

中島誠『変容の時代の日本学：親鸞・宣長・柳田國男』春秋社, 1993, accession # 0180824

野間宏『親鸞』筑摩書房, 増補新版, 1978, accession # 0182131

後藤宏之『転向と伝統思想：昭和史の中の親鸞と西鶴』思想の科学社, 1977, accession # 0183043

相良亨ほか編集『自然』（『講座 日本思想』第1巻）東京大学出版会, 1983, accession # 0184925

佐藤正英『歎異抄論註』青土社, 1989, accession # 0185391

家永三郎教授東京教育大学退官記念論集刊行委員会編『古代・中世の社会と思想』（『家永三郎教授東京教育大学退官記念論集』第1巻）三省堂, 1979, accession # 0185481

増谷文雄・遠藤周作『親鸞：親鸞講義』朝日出版社, 1979, accession # 0185664

東本願寺出版部編『親鸞の世界』東本願寺出版部, 1964, accession # 0185665

＊赤松俊秀『親鸞』（日本歴史学会編『人物叢書』第65巻）吉川弘文館, 1961, accession # 0185670

＊唐澤富太郎『親鸞の人間性・教育観』第一書房, 1942, accession # 0185730

＊加藤周一『親鸞：一三世紀思想の一面』（『日本文化研究』第8巻）新潮社, 1960, accession # 0186870

親鸞『教行信證』金子大榮校訂, 岩波文庫, 1957, accession # 0189002

＊親鸞述・唯圓編『歎異抄』金子大栄校訂, 岩波文庫, 1931, accession # 0189004

野間宏『歎異抄』岩波新書, 1978, accession # 0189676

西田幾多郎著・竹内良知編『西田幾多郎』（『近代日本思想大系』第11巻）筑摩書房, 1974, accession # 0192083

三木清著・住谷一彦編『三木清集』（『近代日本思想大系』第27巻）筑摩書房, 1975, accession # 0192097

三木清『三木清全集』第18巻, 岩波書店, 1968, accession # 0192715

親鸞『親鸞：教行信証』（『原典日本仏教の思想』）星野元豊・石田充之・家永三郎校注, 岩波書店, 1990, accession # 0193397

笠原一男『親鸞研究ノート』図書新聞社, 1965, accession # 0193585

親鸞著・石田瑞麿編訳『親鸞』（『日本の名著』第6巻）中央公論社, 1969, accession # 0195611

親鸞著・増谷文雄編『親鸞集』（『日本の思想』第3巻）筑摩書房, 1968, accession # 0203069

＊親鸞『親鸞』（『日本思想大系』第11巻）星野元豊・石田充之・家永三郎校注, 岩波書店, 1971, accession # 0203111

三木清ほか『現代評論集』（『現代日本文学大系』第97巻）, 筑摩書房, 1973, accession # 0205270

梅本克己『宗教・文学・人間』（梅本克己著作集編集委員会編『梅本克己著作集』第9巻）, 三一書房, 1978, accession # 0205309

Among the superb studies of Shinran by Ienaga Saburō from the perspective of intellectual history, the

Archive does hold *Nihon shisōshi ni okeru hitei no ronri no hattatsu* (Kōbundō, 1940, accession # 0193328), but this copy does not contain any marginal notes by Maruyama.

In addition to these titles, works by Hatano Seiichi and Maruyama's marginal notes are important for understanding Maruyama's concern with religion (a point made by Professor Matsuzawa Hiroaki). The Archive holds the following works by Hatano:

＊波多野精一『時の永遠』岩波書店, 1943, accession # 0181599

波多野精一『宗教哲学序論』岩波書店, 1940, accession # 0187815

＊波多野精一『宗教哲学』岩波書店, 1935, accession # 0188667

Among the titles mentioned above, at the end of the copy of Hatano's *Shūkyō tetsugaku*, for example, Maruyama added the following note: "Finished reading on March 3, 1938, the day I was finally allowed to leave my bed after suffering from pleural pneumonia since the beginning of the year." Or again, at the end of his copy of Berdyaev's *Dostoevsky's World View*, Maruyama added "September 8, 1943." Such notes indicating the day he finished reading a given work are significant in helping to establish the period of his concern with religious issues.

（†2） Among Maruyama's manuscript materials, the Archive holds an extensive file of manuscript pages and memoranda he compiled in the course of preparing his review of Bellah's work ("Berā, *Tokugawa jidai no shūkyō ni tsuite* kanren memo," Materials #306. The image file available through the Virtual Archive runs to 142 pages).

Needless to say, among Maruyama's books the Archive holds many copies of Bellah's works. For reference, see the following list (includes writing by Bellah concerning Maruyama acquired by the Archive following Maruyama's death.

R・N・ベラーほか『心の習慣：アメリカ個人主義のゆくえ』島薗進・中村啓志共訳, みすず書房, 1991, accession # 0180080

＊ Robert N. Bellah, *Tokugawa religion : the values of pre-industrial Japan*, New York: Free Press, c1957. accession # 0180407

Robert N. Bellah, etc., *The Good society*, New York: Knopf, 1991. accession # 0180439

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（†3）　Maruyama's attitude toward Bellah's notion of "civil religion" can be discerned in his comments to the Orthodoxy and Heresy research group.　See "'O-seitō to L-seitō' [fukumu kokutairon]," transcript of remarks, October 23, 1989（Materials #720-2), pp. 33-35.　For reference, I introduce them here.

Taking up the 1960s civil rights and anti-war movements in the United States（following the subsiding of McCarthyism）as calling into question the "intellectual foundation"（Orthodoxy）of American democracy, Maruyama argued that from the Establishment point view they could be seen as constituting "anti-*kokutai* style of behavior."　And he then had the following to say:

> It was against this social context that Robert Bellah proposed his notion of "civic religion": …as an attempt to stem the relentless flood of social relativism and the social decay and pathological phenomena that accompany it.　As such it can be understood as an American version of the movement to "clarify the national polity" [that had effectively purged Japanese academia of liberal thought in the mid 1930s].　When I went there, I said to Bellah: "isn't your idea just like the 'clarify the national polity movement?'"　In reply, he just laughed out loud—but he certainly didn't deny it.　Further, in the fact that more than the American constitution he emphasizes in particular the significance of the Declaration of Independence, we can discern his intent to seek in Orthodoxy [O-seitō] an intellectual foundation that is something more than the self-evident repetition of Legitimacy [L-seitō].　Again, although the terms of the argument are more limited, whether we consider the reappraisal of Leo Strauss's natural law approach, which seemed to have been destroyed in the heyday of the trend toward behaviorism in American political science since the 1980s, or Sheldon Wolin's front-and-center raising of the issue of legitimacy, this series of attempts at a fundamental reconstruction of political science suggests that contemporary intellectual trends can't be interpreted solely in terms of the advance of empiricist positivism and value relativism.（Orthodoxy has not grown old—has not gone out of date.）

Note that this item is based on Maruyama's recorded comments to the Orthodoxy and Heresy group, which were then transcribed by the editor at Chikuma Shobō.　Aside from having taken the liberty of correcting obvious transcription errors, it is unchanged.　For an overview of the pertinent materials, see Kōno Yūri, "Legitimacy no fujō to sono airo: Seitō to itan Kenkyūkai to Maruyama seijigaku," *Gendai shisō* 42, no. 11（Aug. 2014).